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L. C. SKELTON, 
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of Utah; J. LaRUE OGDEN, JER-
ALD CHRISTIANSEN, RAYMO·ND 
J. CORFIELD, DANIEL M. 
SCHWARTZ, GLEN L. ENKE, 
WAYNE SHAW, and E. W. ENGEL-
MANN, as Members of the Repre-
sentative Committee of Professional 
Engineers and Land Surveyors, 
Defendants a.nd Appellants. 
Case No. 
8752 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In respondent's brief it is claimed that Chapte·r 118, 
Laws of Utah 1955 (Chapter 22, Title 58, U. C. A. 1953, 
as amended) , is unconstitutional. In our initial brief we 
did not consider the question of constitutionality and there-
fore it is deemed vital that respondent's arguments be met. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
CHAPTER 118, LAWS OF UTAH 1955 (CHAP-
TER 22, TITLE 58, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMEND-
ED) IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
CHAPTER 118, LAWS OF UTAH 1955 (CHAP-
TER 22, TITLE 58, U. C. A. 1953, AS AMEND-
ED) IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The respondent's brief challenges the constitutionality 
of Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1955 (Chapter 22, Title 58, 
U. C. A. 1953, as amended), as unlawfully delegating author-
ity to an administrative agency without specifying the lim-
itations within which the agency is to act. As authority 
respondent relies upon the 1953 case of Prouty v. Heron 
(Colo.), 255 P. 2d 755. 
Our consideration of respondent's claim will be as fol-
lows: 
"In approaching the subject we have in mind 
the rule that when an act of the Legislature is at-
tacked on grounds of unconstitutionality the ques-
tion presented is not whether it is possible to con-
demn the act, but whether it is possible to uphold 
it. The presumption is always in favor of validity, 
and legislative enactments must be sustained unless 
clearly in violation of fundamental law. * * * 
Every presumption will be indulged in favor of leg-
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islation and only clear and demonstrable usurpation 
of power will authorize judicial interference with 
legislative action. * * *" Lehi City v. Meiling, 
87 Utah 237, 48 P. 2d 526. 
In Prouty v. Heron, supra, an action was. brought to 
enjoin the Colorado State Board of Examiners for Engi-
neers and Land Surveyors from classifying engineers as 
to specific branches, the plaintiff challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Colorado legislation which authorized the 
Board to restrict engineering licenses. to specific branches 
of the engineering field. In holding the act unconstitutional, 
the Colorado Supreme Court set out specific wording in 
the statute which it deemed objectionable. However, the 
same wording, and the problem of unlawful delegation has 
been considered in other jurisdictions and the issue resolved 
in favor of constitutionality. 
In the 1955 case of People v. Babcock, 343 Mich. 671, 
73 N. W. 2d 521, a Michigan act providing for the regis-
tration of professional engineers, architects and land sur-
veyors, stated in part: 
"An applicant for examination for registration 
* * * must * * * have not less than eight 
years of practical experience in architectural or 
engineering work * * * or must be a graduate 
in architecture or engineering of a college or school 
acceptable to the Board, and have had not less than 
four years of experience of a nature satisfactory to 
the Board." (Emphasis added.) 
The Act also provided : 
"The Board shall issue a certificate of registra-
tion upon payment of registration fees as provided 
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4 
for in this act to any applicant who in the opinion of 
the Board has satisfactorily met all the requirements 
of the act * * * (Emphasis added.) 
The statute was challenged on the basis of being vague, 
indefinite, an unlawful delegation of legislative authority 
to an administrative agency and in violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution and Article V 
of the Constitution of Michigan. The court concluded: 
"The object of the act is to safeguard the life, 
health and property of the citizens of the state by 
providing tests for each applicant and to provide 
certificates to those who meet the qualifications pro-
vided by the Legislature. The act is constitutional." 
In the case of Clayton v. Bennett, 5 Utah 2d 152, 298 
P. 2d 531, this court held constitutional legislation which 
delegated to the Department of Registration, upon action 
and report of the appropriate representative committee, the 
following power : 
" ( 1) defining * * * what shall consti-
tute a school, college, * * * in good standing. 
(2) Establishing a standard of preliminary education 
deemed requisite to admission to any school, college 
or university. (3) Prescribing the standard of 
qualification requisite before license shall issue 
* * * ( 5) Providing for a fair and wholly im-
partial method of examination * * * " 
We submit that the delegation considered in the Clayton 
decision was as broad, if not broader, in scope than the 
delegation under consideration in the case at bar. In the 
Clayton case, this court stated: 
"In regard to the second matter complained of, 
the alleged failure of the legislature to prescribe 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
definite standards, it is to be noted that certain 
basic qualifications relating to education, age, moral 
character and the requirement of satisfactorily pass-
ing an examination are set forth in the statutes. It 
seems obvious that the legislature could go no fur-
ther than to set up such general standards." * * * 
In Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, the Supreme Court 
of the United States held: 
"The statute provides that the examination shall 
be before a board of practicing dentists; that the 
applicant must be a graduate of a reputable dental 
school; and that he must be of good moral character. 
Thus, the general standard of fitness and the char-
acter and scope of the examination are clearly indi-
cated. Whether the applicant possesses the qualifi-
cations inherent in that standard is a question of 
fact. * * * The decision of that fact involves 
ordinarily the determination of two subsidiary ques-
tions of fact. The first, what the knowledge and 
skill are which fit one to practice the profession. 
The second, whether the applicant possesses that 
knowledge and skill. The latter finding is necessar-
ily an individual one. The former is ordinarily one 
of general application. Hence, it can be embodied 
in rules. The legislature itself may make this find-
ing of the facts of general application, and, by em-
bodying it in the statute, make it law. When it does 
so, the function of the examining board is limited to 
determining whether the applicant complies with the 
requirements so declared. But the legislature need 
not make this general finding. To determine the 
subjects of which one must have knowledge in order 
to be fit to practice dentistry; the extent of knowl-
edge in each subject; the degree of skill requisite; 
and the procedure to be followed in conducting the 
examination ;-these are matters appropriately com-
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mitted to an administrative board. * * * And 
a legislature may, consistently with the Federal 
Constitution, delegate to such board the function of 
determining these things, as well as the function 
of determining whether the applicant complies with 
the detailed standard of fitness." * * * 
The foregoing was quoted with approval and was support 
for the decision of this court in Clayton v. Bennett, supra. 
See also Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425. 
Garman v. Myers (Okla.), 80 P. 2d, concerned itself 
with two of the problems before this court. In addition to 
setting forth a definition of "arbitrary" similar to that 
advocated in our initial brief, the court considered statutory 
language similar to that which is objected to by the respon-
dent. That case held in part: 
"Plaintiff here contends that to hold the Board 
has unlimited power to determine what constitutes 
engineering experience which is to say the Legisla-
ture provided no rule or standard to test the qualifi-
cations, in effect leaving the entire matter to an 
arbitrary declaration of the Board. 
"Such is not our understanding of either the 
Act or the power vested in the Board. Plaintiff 
argues in this respect that the provision of the Act 
stating 'of a character satisfactory to the Board,' 
does not permit an exercise of discretion by the 
Board, so long as the experience claimed falls within 
the definitions of professional engineering as set 
forth in Section 2 of the Act, saying the delegation 
of an arbitrary power 'vould clearly be unconstitu-
tional. 
"We find no merit in this argument. The legis-
lature created this Board, defined the phases of en-
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gineering to be considered, and empowered this 
Board to pass upon applicants, to determine whether 
they were properly qualified under the terms of the 
Act itself. No arbitrary power was vested in the 
Board, the only power vested in the Board being the 
power to examine applicants under the standards set 
forth in the Act. The Board did not prescribe what 
constituted engineering experience, but only, after 
hearing plaintiff's application, determined by ap-
plying the standard set up in the Act itself, that 
certain experience claimed by plaintiff was not the 
type of engineering service requiring the applica-
tion of engineering principles." (Emphasis added.) 
See State v. Spears (N. M.), 259 P. 2d 356; Hatfield v. N. 
M. State Board of Reg. (N. M.), 290 P. 2d 1077. 
In Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial Com-
mission, 236 U. S. 230, a statute empowered a State Board 
of Censors to permit exhibition of "only such films as are 
in the judgment and discretion of censors of a moral, edu-
cational or amusing and harmless character." This statute 
was upheld as against an attack of unlawful delegation. 
In Ex Parte Whitley, 77 P. 879, a statute granted 
power to a Board of Dental Examiners to determine what 
constitutes "a reputable dental college." The statute was 
upheld as against a challenge of unlawful delegation. 
In Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, an ordinance 
provided for the granting of a license to sell cigarettes: 
"* * * if the mayor shall be satisfied that 
the [applicants] are of good character and reputa-
tion * * * " 
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The ordinance was upheld. 
In People v. Witte (Ill.), 146 N. E. 178, a statute pro-
vided that undergraduate studies for candidates to practice 
medicine shall be such "as shall be satisfactory to the De-
partment." The court held that such phraseology did not 
constitute an. unlawful delegation. See also State v. 
Lawrence (N. C.), 197 S. E. 586; State v. City of Billings 
(Mont.), 255 P. 11. 
According to 33 Am. J ur ., Licenses, Sec. 60, page 378-9: 
"* * * It is generaYy held that licensing 
boards may be invested with discretion in respect of 
the personal fitness or character of applicants or 
mere matters of detail." 
In the annotation, Vesting discretion in public officials, 92 
A. L. R. 400 at 410, the text states: 
"It has been held that it is not always necessary 
that statutes and ordinances prescribe a special rule 
of action, but, on the other hand, some situations 
require the vesting of some discretion in public offi-
cials, as, for instance, where it is difficult or im-
practicable to lay down a definite comprehensive 
rule, or the discretion relates to the administration 
of a police regulation and is necessary to protect the 
public morals, health, safety and general welfare. 
It may be noted that the modern tendency is to be 
more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to 
administrative bodies or officers in order to facili-
tate the administration of laws as the complexity of 
economic and governmental conditions increases." 
It is an accepted rule that statutes granting in general 
terms to public officials the discretionary right to grant 
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or refuse licenses have been upheld where the discretion 
involved personal fitness of the applicants. The theory be-
hind this principle is that if a statute is susceptible of two 
constructions, the construction sustaining its validity must 
be given, and therefore the statute giving discretionary 
power will be construed as giving reasonable discretion, 
rather than the right arbitrarily to discriminate between 
applicants. See annotation, Vesting discretion in public 
officials, 12 A. L. R. 1435 at 1450; 54 A. L. R. 1104 at 1112, 
and 92 A. L. R. 400 at 415. 
Thus far we have considered respondent's objection to 
language of Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1955 (Chapter 22, 
Title 58, U. C. A. 1953 as amended) other than the wording 
found in the grandfather clause of the act. Directing our 
analysis specifically to the latter provision, we submit that 
the phrase therein, "mechanical, electrical, or civil engi-
neering" lends itself to such certainty that further defini-
tion is impractical and unnecessary. We base our conviction 
upon a consideration of the history and purpose of this 
grandfather clause, and the use of the terminology in the 
experience of men. 
Under Section 58-10-2, U. C. A. 1953, the engineer 
licensing act so defined engineering as to include only those 
applying "civil, electrical, or mechanical engineering prin-
ciples and data." The Department of Business Regulation 
so applied the law in its execution, and received re-affirm-
ance in this application through a legal opinion of the At-
torney General in 1953, which opinion in substance con-
cluded that the Act applied to only civil, mechanical and 
electrical engineers. 
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The 1955 legislation in question can only be interpreted 
in its historical setting, for according to State v. Streeter 
(Minn.), 33 N. W. 2d 56: 
"* * * The purpose of an exception or 
grandfather clause is to exempt from the statutory 
regulation imposed for the first time on a trade or 
profession those members thereof who are then 
engaged in the newly regulated field on the theory 
that they who have acceptably followed such pro-
fession or trade for a period of years, or who are 
engaged therein on a certain date, may be presumed 
to have the qualifications which subsequent entrants 
to the field must demonstrate by examination." 
* * * (Emphasis added.) 
See also Annotation, Construction of Grandfather clause, 
4 A. L. R. 2d 667. 
Had Chapter 22, Title 58, U. C. A. 1953 as amended, 
been couched in phraseology so as to limit grandfather 
rights to practitioners "other than those subject to Chapter 
10, Title 58, U. C. A. 1953," we submit there would be no 
question as to proper delegation. The present phraseology 
does nothing more than make the same limitation. The re-
spondent being subject to the provisions of Chapter 10, Title 
58, U. C. A. 1953, the grandfather exemption in the 1955 law 
would have no application to him, for its savings features 
extend to those who are being regulated for the first time. 
In the Prouty case, the Colorado court found vagueness 
or uncertainty where a statute provided for licensing of 
engineers by "branches". No such problem exists here. The 
Utah statute is not concerned with distinctions between, 
or similarities of, the various branches of engineering, but 
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rather with the extension of grandfather privileges 'to the 
newly regulated. 
The controlling rule of statutory construction is that 
legislative intent should be ascertained and given effect. 
We submit that the general purpose behind grandfather 
provisions, and the peculiar history of the engineer licens-
ing laws in Utah, establish sufficient guides and standards 
in this case for administrative action. 
All of this, of course, is not to abandon the argument 
that the phrase, "mechanical, electrical, and civil engineer-
ing" reduces itself to definition common to the sense and 
experience of men, and that further explanation is in this 
instance impractical and unnecessary. It is deemed note-
worthy in this connection that the curricula of the colleges 
of engineering in this state, as well as others, offer courses 
in civil, mechanical and electrical engineering; that degrees 
are awarded in these branches, as distinguished from other 
engineering classifications; that engineers refer to speciali-
zations in the branches enumerated. 
In Howarth v. Gilman (Pa~), 73 A. 2d 655, a Pennsyl-
vania statute defined practice of engineering as "the prac-
tice of civil engineering, mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering * * * " The court rejected arguments at-
tacking the definition for want of certainty, holding that 
an act will not be declared inoperative if common sense 
and reason can devise and provide the means necessary for 
its execution. Respondent's argument, if applied to the 
Pennsylvania case would in fact require further definition 
of the definition. 
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:"Civil engineering", "mechanical engineering" and 
"electrical engineering" are all defined in Webster's New 
International Dictionary with sufficient precision to be 
applicable to interpretation of the Utah statute in question. 
In Hatfield v. New Mexico Stat,e Board of Registration 
(N. M.), 290 P. 2d 1077, a state board had power to revoke 
a certificate of registration if the registrant was found 
guilty of "gross negligence, incompetency or misconduct 
* * *" No definition of these terms was set forth in the 
act. Against a challenge of unlawful delegation the court 
held the statute constitutional. 
In Mutual Film Corporation v. Ohio Industrial Com-
mission, 236 U. S. 230, the court stated: 
"The objection to the statute is that it furnishes 
no standard of what is educational, moral, amusing 
or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary 
judgment, whim and caprice; or, aside from those 
extremes, leaving it to the different views which 
might be entertained of the effect of the pictures, 
permitting the 'personal equation' to enter, resulting 
'in unjust discrimination against some propagandist 
film,' while others might be approved without ques-
tion. But the statute by its provisions guards against 
such variant judgments, and its terms, like other 
general terms, get precision from the sense and ex-
perience of men and become certain and useful guides 
in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of 
the instances of their application would be as im-
possible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such 
sense and experience, therefore, the law properly 
relies." * * * 
In Block v. Chicago (Ill.), 87 N. E. 1011, an ordinance 
empowered the Chief of Police to refuse permits for the 
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showing of pictures which were "immoral or obscene."' This 
statute was upheld as against an attack of unlawful dele-
gation. 
We submit that the wordings in question in the fore-
going cases are much more susceptible to diverse interpre-
tation and meaning than the phraseology before this court; 
yet such wording was not fatal despite the lack of further 
definition, all of which points up the inescapable conclu-
sion that ultra strict adherance to any rule which requires 
legislative defining of all terms in licensing statutes must 
result in a definition of definitions to insure absolute cer-
tainty; and on ad infinitum. The public health, safety, and 
welfare demand regulation of the professions; such cannot 
be sacrificed upon respondent's altar which consists of 
nothing more than a play on words. 
The ironical thing about respondent's argument on 
this point is that the applicant and the Committee talk the 
same language and have no misunderstanding as to what 
is civil, mechanical or electrical engineering. The applicant 
claimed that he applied the principles of civil and mechani-
cal but not electrical engineering (Tr. 56). Exhibit P-4 sets 
forth references denoting his engineering experience as 
being civil or mechanical. Making his application, respon-
dent did not consider the words "mechanical, electrical or 
civil engineering" so vague or ambiguous that any objec-
tion was raised ; in fact, he had no difficulty in alleging 
experience in those areas and his references indicate a com-
mon understanding of those terms. 
Heretofore we have set forth the rule that the presump-
tion is always in favor of the legislative validity and enact-
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ments must be sustained unless clearly in violation of fun-
damental law ... Lehi City v. Meiling, supra. 
Furthermore, the act in question contained a savings-
clause to the effect that "if any section or sections of this 
act· shall be declared unconstitutional or invalid this shall 
not invalidate any other sections of this act." (Section 23, 
Chapter 118, Laws of Utah 1955.) 
"The principles which underlie the application 
of the savings clause have been well established. In 
the absence of legislative declaration that invalidity 
of a portion of a statute shall not affect the remain-
der, the presumption is that the Legislature intends 
the act to be effective as an entirety. The effect of 
such a statutory declaration is to create, not the pre-
sumption of entirety in effect ordinarily accorded the 
statutes, but an opposite presumption of separabil-
ity." 11 Am. J ur ., Constitutional Law, Sec. 156, page 
847, and cases cited therein. 
Particularly appropriate in summary is the following 
quotation from Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Third 
Edition, Sec. 322 : 
"The tendency of the more recent cases is to 
sustain delegations of the licensing power even when 
broad discretions are delegated. This tendency 
seems justifiable when activity of licensing is an 
appropriate field for legislative regulation and 
where the determination of conditions is impractic-
able for legislative resolution and the legislature has 
provided as practical a standard for administrative 
guidance as is appropriate for the particular regu-
lation. This~ rule, of course, leaves most cases to be 
decided on the particular facts involved but it should 
al1oays be 1"ecognized that in the determination of 
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quaifications for licenses, the agency who is able to 
see and examine the applicant is usually in the best 
position to decide; that abuses of discretion may be 
held invalid without invalidating the statute; and 
that no appreciable divesting of legislative power is 
involved in the delegation." (Emphasis added.) 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the authority and reasoning set forth in 
our initial brief and the argument outlined in our reply, we 
submit that the decision of the lower court should be re-
versed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
RAYMOND W. GEE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for App,eUants. 
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